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"For Lack of a National Policy on Consumer
Credit ... "; Preliminary Thoughts on the Need for
Unified Federal Agency Rulemaking
By RALPH J. ROHNER*
The federal regulatory framework affecting the consumer credit market-
place is a peculiar one. No less than nine separate agencies' have been given
enforcement responsibilities over particular segments of the consumer credit
industry. Each of these agencies has some measure of rulemaking authority,
at least with respect to administrative enforcement procedures and often with
respect to substantive matters as well. Two of the agencies, the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission, have special substantive
rulemaking authority for the banking and non-banking communities respec-
tively.' And the Federal Reserve Board has ostensibly plenary regulation-
writing authority under a number of specific consumer protection statutes.3
That this regulatory framework has produced frictions, tensions and
uncertainties as to compliance requirements, and claims of anticonsumerism
from some quarters, is hardly surprising given its history. That these problems
should continue and increase through the 1970s and into the 1980s is
regrettable. Whether they are avoidable or solvable is quite another matter,
however.
Increasing awareness of what seem to be conflicting regulatory policies
from the various federal agencies led the Section's Committee on the Regula-
tion of Consumer Credit to create a special Subcommittee on Unified
*Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America; Chairman, Subcommittee on Unified
Rulemaking, Committee on the Regulation of Consumer Credit, ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law.
This article is a synthesis of remarks made at a program sponsored by the Subcommittee on
Unified Rulemaking in Williamsburg, Virginia, on April 8, 1979. The program participants
included Roland E. Brandel, San Francisco; Ralph J. Rohner, Washington, D.C.; Milton W.
Schober, Washington, D.C.; William J. O'Connor, Jr., Buffalo; and Mark Silbcrgeld, Washing-
ton, D.C. This article does not represent views of participants, nor of the Committee; rather it
illuminates the issues from various perspectives and should assist in approaching this problem
more knowledgeably.
1. I.e., the Comptroller of the Currency; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
Federal Reserve Board; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; the National Credit Union
Administration; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Farm Credit
Administration; and the Federal Trade Commission.
2. Under § 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 557a) both agencies are
authorized to issue rules or regulations which identify specific acts or practices which are "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices."
3. There are explicit directives to the Board to issue regulations under the Truth in Lending
(including its Fair Credit Billing and Consumer Leasing chapters), Equal Credit Opportunity,
Home Mortgage Disclosure, and Electronic Fund Transfer Acts.
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Rulemaking to examine the extent of problems attributable to multiple
agency roles and to recommend possible improvements. This effort is part of a
larger government and ABA effort. There is a pervading atmosphere of
regulatory reform throughout the federal government. The administration has
initiated steps toward deregulation in several industries. The President has
issued an executive order on "improving government regulations," 4 and in
March 1979 announced a broad package of regulatory reform proposals.5
Independently, the American Bar Association's Commission on Law and the
Economy has issued its exposure draft entitled "Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform," and the Administrative Conference of the United States has
released its study of the rulemaking procedures at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. The ABA's Section on Corporation, Banking & Business Law has itself
created an Ad Hoc Committee on Regulatory Reform. 6 Regulatory reform
proposals are pending in Congress.7
Thus, while an examination of federal agency regulatory activity in the
consumer credit area is novel, it is but a piece of a larger inquiry into the
wisdom, effectiveness and fairness of federal regulatory programs.
Origins of the Present Structure
Congress' first entry into the consumer credit field was the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (principally the Truth in Lending Act)' in 1968. This
was actually a modest intervention, imposing standardized disclosure require-
ments on transactions whose substantive terms were controlled almost exclu-
sively by state law. Indeed Congress' intent not to preempt state laws is stated
very clearly in the Truth in Lending Act itself.' Congress dutifully assigned
enforcement responsibilities to a number of agencies according to their
existing constituencies-to the banking agencies for the several classes of
banks, to the Home Loan Bank Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Farm Credit Administration, and so
on-with the bulk of the enforcement chore given to the Federal Trade
Commission. The Act obviously required consistent regulatory elaboration,
and so regulation writing authority needed to be vested in one agency. The
reluctant choice was the Federal Reserve Board-partly because it was within
the jurisdictional sphere of the Congressional banking committees from which
the Truth in Lending Act originated, and partly because the other likely
4. Exec. Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (1978).
5. 15 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs. 491 (March 26, 1979). These have since been introduced
in the 96th Congress as S.755 and H.R. 3263 ("The Regulation Reform Act of 1979").
6. Chairman's Message, Regulatory Reform and the Corporate Bar, 34 Bus. Law 1637
(1979).
7. See, e.g., S. 1291,96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), the Administrative Practice and Regulatory
Control Act of 1979 introduced by Senators Kennedy, Metzeabaum and Ribicoff on June 6, 1979;
S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), the Reform of Federal Regulation Act, introduced on
January 31, 1979 with more than 30 cosponsors.
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq.
9. Truth in Lending Act § 111, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1610.
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choice (the Federal Trade Commission) was then being criticized for ineffec-
tiveness.
Since 1968 Congress has added one consumer credit protection law after
another.1 ° Under some, the allocation of regulation writing duties is vested
exclusively in the Federal Reserve Board, as under Truth in Lending; under
others, no agency can write interpretive regulations; and under a recent
community-responsibility statute" each of the financial institutions agencies
was instructed to issue its own regulations. Where the Federal Reserve Board
was powerless to regulate, the FTC stepped in with unofficial interpretations
and guidelines. In the meantime the Trade Commission's own authority to
deal broadly with "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce" was affirmed and strengthened and used."2 Under the pressure of a
lawsuit by consumer groups, several of the agencies have issued regulations
expanding creditors' non-discrimination compliance duties beyond those
imposed by the Federal Reserve. 3 Among the many agencies, all of which had
the potential for setting divergent policy goals and creating friction, the
largest source of friction, not surprisingly, has been between the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission, instances of which are
noted below.
Congress also fostered multiple lawmaking from sources outside the federal
government. Throughout the decade since 1968, Congress has never signifi-
cantly changed its posture on the relationship between federal and state laws
dealing with consumer credit. That posture is one of very limited preemption,
with the result that the state legislatures and agencies add an overlay of
consumer protections and compliance responsibilities that are rarely coordi-
nated with the requirements of federal laws and regulations.
Lack of a National Policy on Consumer Credit
Sharply differing perceptions arise as to the nature and kinds of problems
multiple agency rulemaking has caused, and what shape any regulatory
10. In 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Truth in Lending Amendments; in 1974, the
Fair Credit Billing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act Amendments, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act; in 1976, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments, the Consumer Leasing
Act and the discount-surcharge amendment to Truth in Lending; in 1977, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, and the Community Reinvestment Act; in 1978, the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
1I. The Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128 title VIII (1977).
12. The Commission's inherent authority to issue trade regulation rules was upheld in judicial
decisions, and its jurisdiction was extended by legislation to transactions either "in" or "affect-
ing" commerce. In 1975, in Pub. L. No. 93-637 title I1, the Commission was given express
statutory authority to issue trade regulation rules, to seek restitution from violators, and to impose
fines of $10,000 per day.
13. Both the FDIC and the FHLBB have issued special regulations concerning discrimination
in residential mortgage transactions. 12 C.F.R. pts. 338, 528. Those regulations were in part a
response to a suit brought against the agencies by the National Urban League and other groups
alleging nonenforcement of the Fair Housing Act.
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reform ought to take. While unified rulemaking offers certain advantages,
embracing the notion of a single federal regulatory body for consumer credit
may be unattractive without a clearer picture of what philosophy of consumer
protection that body would implement.
The lack of a uniform national policy for consumer credit transactions is not
a new topic of concern. As long ago as 1972, the National Commission on
Consumer Finance, created under title IV of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, examined the existing consumer credit supervisory and regulatory
mechanisms. Its review dwelt more upon enforcement of consumer credit laws
and regulations than it did on their formulation.
The Commission examined the three dimensional matrix of consumer
regulation-a matrix whose vertical dimensions are the federal scale, the
horizontal dimensions are the state enforcement scale, and the third (or
depth) dimension is creditor classification. Based on this rather unique model,
the Commission reached a number of conclusions, among which were the
following:
1. Consumer credit protection laws were intended to protect equally all
the citizens of a state or of the United States.
2. The degree of this protection should not depend on whether the
consumer deals with a federal or a state chartered institution.
3. All agencies ... should conduct examinations designed to insure
compliance."
Thus, the Commission concluded that protection is protection is protection,
and that consumers were entitled to it, regardless of the type of creditor or the
agency enforcing compliance. What the Commission did not come right out
and say, but what may be inferred from the entirety of chapter 4 of the NCCF
report, is that creditors should be able to expect the same evenhanded
treatment.
Based upon those general premises, the Commission recommended that:
Congress create ... a unit to be known as the Bureau of Consumer Credit
(BCC) with full statutory authority to issue rules and regulations and
supervise all examination and enforcement functions under the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, including TIL (emphasis added).'5
Note that this new Bureau would be a central source for the issuance of
rules, but would merely "supervise" enforcement by existing agencies.
Implementation of that approach has not occurred, however, and faces an
immense hurdle which it is doubtful Congress is ready to jump, i.e., adoption
of a national policy with respect to consumer credit.
14. National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States 53
(1972).
15. Id. at 58.
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It is difficult to argue that we have such a policy now. Witness the state of
affairs under just one act; the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Under titles I
(Truth in Lending), VII (Equal Credit Opportunity), and IX (Electronic
Fund Transfers), the Federal Reserve Board is given authority to promulgate
implementing regulations. Enforcement, however, is parceled out to eight or
more other federal agencies which are given specific authority to make their
own rules respecting enforcement procedures.
Titles VI (Fair Credit Reporting) and VIII (Debt Collection), on the other
hand, are under the primary enforcement authority of the Federal Trade
Commission. Although the Commission does not have rulemaking authority
under these titles, it has taken upon itself to issue "Interpretations" under Fair
Credit Reporting and reportedly has issued several hundred staff interpreta-
tions under the Debt Collection title.
And yet, common sense would tell us that one central agency should have
supreme authority to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations for the
interrelated aspects of consumer credit, whether it be disclosure of the terms
of the transaction, selection of customers to whom credit is extended,
collecting the debt that results from the transaction, or reporting information
to credit bureaus and other creditors about the transaction. There is certainly
sufficient commonality among these various aspects of a consumer credit
transaction to justify delegation to one agency of the authority to interpret the
various acts uniformly and to assure uniform enforcement.
That we do not have that uniformity today is clear. For example, under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Congress provided that each applicant against
whom adverse action was taken in connection with a credit application is
entitled to a statement of the "specific reasons" 16 for that action. The Federal
Reserve Board, with primary regulatory authority, has interpreted this
requirement by requiring that the "principal reason(s)"'17 be available. Thus,
the Board recognized that, in some cases, there is only a single principal
reason. The Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, has recently
brought complaints and obtained consent agreements' requiring at least four
reasons under certain circumstances. The result is that some creditors must
furnish four reasons for adverse action, while creditors subject to another
agency's jurisdiction need furnish only one or more "principal" reasons. For
another example, The Federal Reserve Board in Regulation B provided that a
creditor may request any information about the applicant's spouse that may
be requested about the applicant if the applicant was relying on the spouse's
income as a basis for repayment. 9 The Federal Trade Commission in March
16. ECOA § 701(d)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691.
17. Reg. B 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1975).
18. Alden's Inc., FTC Consent Order, Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 98.065 (1978); United
States v. Federated Dep't Stores, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Ohio 1978); United States v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 97,732 (D.D.C. 1979).
19. Reg. B (12 C.F.R.) § 202.5(c)(2).
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1978 issued an interpretation holding that reliance on income from the
nonapplicant spouse was not a permissible basis for obtaining a credit report
on the nonapplicant spouse. The Commission later modified this rule some-
what, 0 but it still contains several caveats not imposed by the Board.
The lack of a national policy regarding consumer credit is made manifest in
statutes other than the Consumer Credit Protection Act. For example, within
a year after the Magnuson-Moss/FTC Improvements Act became law, the
Commission promulgated its Holder in Due Course2 Rule applicable to
sellers. This rule, as finally promulgated, applied not only to sale credit but
also to "purchase money loans." Although then-Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Burns wrote to then-FTC Chairman Collier requesting a postpone-
ment of the effective date, the Commission declined to do so.
Technically, the rule does not apply to banks; however, the Commission
published with the final rule a proposed amendment which would extend its
coverage to "creditors." Under the unique "triggering" mechanism in the
FTC Act" the Federal Reserve Board will have to issue a similar rule within
60 days after the amendment becomes effective, unless the Board finds that
the failure by banks to preserve consumers' claims and defenses is not an
unfair or deceptive act or practice or that adoption of such a rule for banks
would seriously conflict with essential monetary and payments systems
policies of the Board.
Thus, in a regulatory environment in which Congress has repeatedly
selected the Federal Reserve Board to exercise specific, exclusive rulemaking
power with regard to consumer credit, the FTC has been issued a general
grant of rulemaking power to articulate a rather major shift in substantive
consumer credit law. Further, the trade regulation rule authority of the
Federal Trade Commission permits an agency with neither rulemaking nor
enforcement powers over financial institutions, in effect, to bind a banking
agency to issue similar regulations without a requirement that the Commis-
sion consult with the Board before issuing the regulation.
Another aspect of uniformity bears comment-and that is the matter of
enforcement sanctions. Most (if not all) of the enforcement agencies have
cease and desist powers.2 However, one agency-The Federal Trade Com-
mission-has the authority to bring a civil action to recover penalties of up to
$10,000 per day per violation for violation of its trade regulation rules.24 Thus,
if and when the FTC and the FRB adopt similar deceptive practices rules, the
FTC can seek civil penalties of $10,000 per violation per day against sales
finance companies subject to its jurisdiction, while the Comptroller of the
20. 44 Fed. Reg. 3259 (1979), 16 C.F.R. § 600.8.
21. FTC Trade Regulation Rule, "Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses," 16
C.F.R. pt. 433 (1975).
22. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(f).
23. See, for the banking agencies, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b).
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m)(1)(A).
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Currency would have only cease and desist powers. Moreover, both the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act permit the
Commission to enforce those acts with respect to creditors subject to its
jurisdiction as though they were trade regulation rules.
With respect to its enforcement function under Truth in Lending and Fair
Credit Reporting, if the Commission prevails in a litigated cease and desist
order, it may serve copies of that order on other entities subject to its
jurisdiction and, if any of those entities should violate the order, the Commis-
sion may then proceed with the $10,000 a day civil penalty action.25 This is not
only a unique enforcement tool, but it partakes of substantive lawmaking as
well. Notably, nonparties are exposed to liability for conduct whose illegality
was established through an advisory process in which they were not involved,
rather than a legislative process.
Thus, one agency has very substantial enforcement sanctions as its disposal
which the other agencies do not have. This has a potential for disrupting any
attempt to achieve even-handed enforcement, and presents a very formidable
potential burden to creditors subject to FTC enforcement authority.
The Federal Reserve Board Versus the Federal Trade Commission
Versus the States.
Many of the problems arising from multiple agency rulemaking are
attributable to a "tripartite" Congressional approach to the regulation of
consumer credit. The three parts are: (1) specific federal laws, for which
regulations are issued by the Federal Reserve; (2) a broad mandate to the
Federal Trade Commission to police "unfair or deceptive practices" in the
consumer marketplace; and (3) the Congressional invitation to states to
continue to legislate in the consumer credit area themselves.
On the latter of these approaches, when Congress first got into this business
in the late sixties-in the drafting of the Truth in Lending Act-it made a
conscious decision not to preempt or displace those state laws. Truth in
Lending was to be a simple disclosure statute superimposed on the existing
body of state law. Congress refused to add a federal usury law to Truth in
Lending although that was seriously proposed!
Congressional restraint was evidenced in another fashion. As it added
federal laws to deal with new problems not generally covered in state statutes
-e.g., credit card billing practices, discrimination, and the like-again it
consciously deferred to the states by providing that if any state wanted to
enact a similar law, it would not be preempted unless it were inconsistent with
the federal act, nor would it be deemed inconsistent if it provided greater
consumer protection.
The result has been a deluge of state statutes dealing with credit billing
practices, the disposition of credit balances, discrimination, debt collection
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m)(l)(B).
142 • The Business Lawyer; Vol. 35, November 1979
and the like. The desire of state legislators to do things a little better than their
federal counterparts-or at least a little differently-has led to compliance
and interpretative difficulties at least as significant as those caused by federal
law and regulations.
The problems posed by duplicative state statutes have been exacerbated by
the Congressional decision as to rulemaking at the federal level. In most cases,
Congress has given rule writing authority to the Federal Reserve Board and
then divided enforcement power among a number of other agencies. The
rationale is that the agency which has general jurisdiction over an organiza-
tion should oversee its consumer credit activities. The FTC is given enforce-
ment authority with respect to everyone who does not fit into any one of the
other neat regulatory pigeonholes.
The principal problem with such fragmented enforcement power is, of
course, that each agency, by the exercise of its authority, generates separate
and sometimes conflicting rules of conduct for those subject to its jurisdiction.
More importantly, the decisions made in the enforcement proceedings of one
agency can create precedents affecting the obligations of creditors not subject
to that agency.
The Comptroller of the Currency's staff, for instance, has written some
published interpretative letters."6 In addition, a few years ago that office
decided that it was misleading for banks subject to its jurisdiction to
emphasize on their monthly credit card statements the minimum permissible
payment (as contrasted with the full unpaid balance). When a responsible
government agency takes that type of position, all creditors issuing similar
billing statements are affected. Given the course of Truth in Lending litiga-
tion, it would be folly for creditors not to follow the strictest possible
interpretations of the statutes and Regulation Z.
Divided enforcement authority also permits an agency which is dissatisfied
with a Fed Regulation or Fed staff's interpretations of that Regulation to,
in effect, amend those provisions by the position it takes in enforcement
proceedings.
It can be fairly said with respect to specific federal consumer credit
legislation that, aside from the FTC, no agency has had major public
differences with the rules and interpretations written by the Federal Reserve
Board. Agencies such as the C.A.B., the I.C.C. and the Farm Credit
Administration have a very specialized constituency and limited involvement
in the mainstream of consumer credit. Therefore, one would not expect them
to be innovators.
That is not entirely true of the other financial regulatory agencies, however.
Those agencies have recently coordinated rulemaking with the FRB in the
development of common examination procedures and Enforcement Guide-
26. See, e.g., Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 42-091-42, 096.
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lines for Truth in Lending and ECOA. 27 It is clear that there were significant
differences among those agencies with respect to the content of the Guidelines
and the sanctions to be imposed for violations, but those differences were
debated privately and largely compromised in order to develop compatible
standards.
Looking to the future, one can expect that the establishment under title X of
the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act28 of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council will result in the expan-
sion of those efforts to develop common enforcement practices and procedures
among the bank and thrift regulatory agencies. From an agency point of view,
that is one way to blunt the current proposals (of which pending S.332 is one)
to create a single bank regulatory agency.
Although there will continue to be differences in the particulars of those
agencies' enforcement practices and creditors will continue to be troubled by
what they consider to be aberrations in the decisions of particular regulators,
the problems will not, in this context be major.
This sanguine view, however, does not include the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. First, an obvious point: the FTC does not have the general examination
powers or procedures of the financial regulatory agencies. It was, therefore,
not to be expected that it would participate in the development of the Uniform
Enforcement Guidelines. Moreover, while those Guidelines may work suc-
cessfully for the bank regulatory agencies which divide the regulation of about
15,000 banks and examine them regularly, the FTC, which has hundreds of
thousands of creditors subject to its jurisdiction, has entirely different enforce-
ment problems.
The second point is even more important and is, in fact, the reason why the
major conflicts have involved the FRB and the FTC. It derives from the nature
of the Trade Commission Act itself and the type of agency that has resulted.
During the late 1960s, the Trade Commission was being widely criticized
for being too timid, too bureaucratic, and generally ineffective. The agency
had been formed in 1914 to prevent unfair competition and since 1938 had
had more general authority to prevent unfair and deceptive practices in
commerce. Stung, or perhaps reinvigorated by that criticism and with new
leadership, the FTC began, as we reached the 1970s, to exercise much more
actively what it perceived to be its new mandate, reinforced now by the
Magnuson-Moss/FTC Improvements Act.
It is sufficient to say that the FTC has, during this period, made full use of
an almost unparalleled grant of authority to review and regulate an enor-
mously wide spectrum of commercial activity and to impose in that arena its
27. Final Enforcement Guidelines for Truth in Lending have been adopted and promulgated.
44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979). Proposed guidelines for Equal Credit Opportunity Act enforcement
are still pending, at this writing. 43 Fed. Reg. 29256 (1978).
28. The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act,.Pub. L. No. 95-630
(1978).
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views as to what is unfair or deceptive. This started about the same time as the
Congress was delegating to the Federal Reserve Board much more circum-
scribed rulemaking authority under some rather specific and technical con-
sumer credit statutes, while telling the FTC that it was to be one of nine
agencies charged with enforcing the FRB's administrative decisions.
There is a paradox here. On the one hand, Congress encouraged, or at least
acquiesced in, broad-ranging and essentially unrestrained rulemaking by the
FTC on nearly any subject, including consumer credit. On the other hand,
Congress moved, in its specific consumer credit enactments, in a much more
tentative manner, limiting rulemaking authority, carefully preserving basic
state control of the field, and even encouraging additional state activity.
Congress also apparently expected that an agency like the FTC, granted
such heady freedom under its own statute, would find it acceptable to be
confined to an essentially passive role as an enforcer of another agency's
regulations under consumer credit statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
From almost any point of view, it simply hasn't worked. The Trade
Commission, under its own act, has been far less concerned with administra-
tive restraint or the sensibilities of state legislatures than the Congress. For
instance, 40 states had some sort of legislation dealing with the preservation of
consumers' claims and defenses in dealer-generated consumer obligations.
The Trade Commission Rule29 on this subject preempted nearly all of them.
Several states had Door-to-Door Sales Acts superseded by the FTC's rule 3 on
that subject. As now proposed, the Commission's Credit Practices Rule31
would displace or modify a host of local laws. The question is not whether the
Trade Regulation Rules are good or bad. It is, rather, what is Congressional
policy with respect to the extent of federal intervention in the regulation of
consumer credit?
The Trade Commission's activities as an enforcer of specific consumer
credit statutes also highlight the difficulties inherent in the question, how does
Congress want the statutes now on the books to be administered? While it
granted the Fed basic rulewriting and interpretative authority, as well as
enforcement power, it has permitted the FTC to challenge that grant at nearly
every level of administrative activity.
For example, in 1978 the Trade Commission objected strenuously and
publicly to the Board's amendment of Regulation Z to limit the right of
rescission in open end credit. Also in 1978, its staff submitted to the Fed staff
29. See n. 19, supra.
30. FTC Trade Regulation Rule, "Cooling Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales," 16 C.F.R. pt.
429.
31. FTC Trade Regulation Rule, "Credit Practices" (Proposed 16 C.F.R. pt. 444), 40 Fed.
Reg. 16347 (1975).
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16 proposed revisions to ECOA's Regulation B. When apparently rebuffed, it
came back with four, one of which the Board eventually adopted."
The FTC staff has, over the pastyear or more, regularly objected to Official
Staff Interpretations of both Regulations B and Z. When they filed objections
to that monumental interpretation permitting the use of two sides of a sheet
for revolving credit disclosures,33 it seemed that perhaps the process of
objecting to the Fed's actions had attained a life of its own.
The FTC has also moved strongly at the enforcement level in support of its
views as to how federal consumer credit law should be interpreted and
administered. The FTC staff has, for instance, made it plain that it has grave
doubts as to whether group credit life or disability insurance is ever "volun-
tarily" purchased in finance transactions so that it can be excluded from the
calculation of the finance charge to be disclosed. In proceedings against
Commercial Credit, and more recently in the US Life case,"4 the Commission
imposed stringent form and disclosure requirements nowhere to be found in
either the statute, regulation, or FRB Interpretations.
A similar series of Equal Credit Opportunity proceedings culminated in the
action initiated by the FTC and brought by the Justice Department against
Federated Stores.35 The complaint in that action challenged Federated's
procedure for giving adverse action notices to customers denied credit. In the
process, the Commission took the position that a number of standard reasons
used by Federated to explain its adverse action-reasons derived almost
verbatim from the list of sample reasons in the Fed's Regulation B-were
inadequate and in violation of the law. This has now led to a petition by Sears
to the FRB to take action on what it perceives to be distortions by the FTC in
interpreting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act."6 The FRB has put the Sears
inquiries out for public comment, and the response will undoubtedly bring the
FTC-FRB skirmish into sharp focus.
Without intending to criticize either agency, these examples demonstrate
the need for Congressional decisions as to: (1) the extent to which the federal
government will regulate consumer credit, and (2) the manner in which that is
to be done and the federal instrumentalities which should implement those
Congressional decisions. These are, in large part, political and not legal
questions, but ones which must be answered before attempting to draft a
specific proposal to unify the agency rulemaking function.
32. 44 Fed. Reg. 23813 (1979), amending Reg. B § 202.2(1) ("Creditor").
33. The staff interpretation is FC-0149 (1978).
34. US Life Credit Corp., FTC Final Order, Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 97,938 & 97,871
(1978). The case has been reversed, however, US Life Credit Corp. v. FTC, 599 F.2d 1387 (5th
Cir. 1979).
35. United States v. Federated Dept Stores, supra n. 18.
36. Proposed rulemaking on Equal Credit Opportunity application to Credit Scoring, 44 Fed.
Reg. 23865 (1979).
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Weighing Advantages and Disadvantages of Regulatory Unification
A pragmatic assessment of the claimed advantages and possible disadvan-
tages of rulemaking consolidation is also in order. While there could be
benefits in the form of more uniform and consistent application of the laws
and rules, other benefits, such as cost savings to the agencies and to creditors,
may be marginal at best. In addition, the banking agencies are subject to
criticism for being neither enforcement-effective nor properly oriented toward
consumer protection. 7 In fact, it can be argued they are caught in an inherent
conflict of interest by being responsible both for institutional safety and
soundness and for enforcement of consumer laws.
More uniform application of the laws would almost certainly result from
consolidating federal agency consumer credit rulemaking in a single place.
But the advantage may be only a limited one, for consumer transactions are
not a fungible mass. Complexities arise from the transactions themselves,
from the various ways in which credit is offered, and from the differences
among types of creditors. Further, much of the complexity and some of the
inconsistency in the present state of the regulation interpretations and
guidelines, is due to the insistence by creditors on getting the most precise and
detailed guidance from their regulators on what is adequate compliance.
Some 1,500 FRB letters-virtually all to creditors, and the recent amendment
of TIL and ECOA to permit "blessed" staff interpretations,38 support this
observation. Thus, even if all rulemaking were brought together in one place,
the process of hair-splitting interpretations would continue.
Unified rulemaking might have the benefit of opening up to public scrutiny
the process by which some of the rulemaking occurs. This lack of "sunshine"
has been particularly troublesome for consumer groups in connection with the
Interagency Task Force's work on the TIL and ECOA Enforcement Guide-
lines. But assertions that unified rulemaking will produce significant cost
savings for creditors are dubious. The Congressional hearings are replete with
exaggerated estimates of the costs of creditor compliance, at least when
measured against after-the-fact calculations of actual compliance costs. A
classic example is Sears' estimate of $5 each for adverse action notices which
eventually turned out to cost 50¢.s1
One distinct advantage of unified enforcement, however, would likely be
faster decisions on matters of regulatory interpretation ajid enforcement
37. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-1388, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
38. By virtue of 1976 amendments to TILA § 130(f) and ECOA § 706(e), a creditor cannot
be held liable for acts done "in good faith in conformity with" any interpretation issued by
designated staff members at the Federal Reserve.
39. Compare testimony of Nat'l Retail Merchants Ass'n in Hearings on S. 483 et al. by
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, U. S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs 399 (1975), with Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Exercise of
Consumer Rights Under the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Credit Billing Acts, 64 Fed. Res.
Bull. 363, 365 (1978).
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policy-faster than at present through the use of Interagency Task Forces and
the Interagency Coordinating Committee.
But there are substantial weights on the "disadvantage" side. One of these
could be the beginning of an inexorable process toward eliminating the
sources of marketplace competition. If consumer protection rulemaking were
centralized in one agency, would the existing agencies retain the clout and the
individuality to authorize share drafts, interest bearing checking accounts,
and other innovative customer services?
From an exclusively consumerist perspective, the great potential disadvan-
tage of regulatory unification would be the probable elimination of the
Federal Trade Commission's role. Or to put the matter in another way,
unification of rulemaking authority would sit well with consumer groups only
if the FTC became the exclusive rulemaker. The reason for this judgment is
that only the FTC has the track record and the independent perspective to be
the repository of consumer credit rulemaking authority.
Only as recently as 1976 and 1977 did the banking agencies begin to
acknowledge that there were substantial numbers of violations committed by
banks under their supervision, and so they began to redesign their enforce-
ment programs. Among consumer groups, many of the promulgated and
proposed rules-especially those affecting EFT and ECOA-are viewed as
inadequate or even improper implementations of the law.4" Further, the FRB
in particular has had a penchant for hard-nosed resistance to consumer group
requests and proposals. 1
The dominant consumer objection to vesting unified rulemaking in the
FRB, however, is the conflict of interest between its role as protector of bank
solvency, and its role as protector of the bank's credit customers. Vigorous
rulemaking and enforcement, with the resulting exposure of the bank to
agency restitution orders or private civil penalties, could impinge on the
agency's traditional concern for safety and soundness. Even if the agency were
objective-minded enough to give equally vigorous effect to both missions, the
inculcation of that dual mission in the examiners and other old-line personnel
would be no easy task.
Ultimately, the question of whether federal agency rulemaking should be
unified comes down to the question of who-with what philosophy and
attitude-would control that unified process. Even this conclusory restate-
ment of the basic question is a repetition of history, for the Senate Banking
40. A recent example: when the Federal Reserve Board amended Regulation Z with respect to
the customer's right to rescind certain open-end credit transactions, Consumers Union sued the
Board on grounds the regulatory amendment violated the statute. Consumers Union v. Miller,
Civ. No. 78-2188 (D.D.C. 1978). The suit is still pending at this writing.
41. When the National Urban League sued the major financial regulatory agencies for failure
to enforce the Fair Housing Act, each of the agencies negotiated a settlement with the plaintiffs,
except the Federal Reserve Board which challenged the plaintiffs' standing and eventually won a
dismissal on that ground. Nat'l Urban League v. Comptroller of the Currency, 78 F.R.D. 543
(D.D.C. 1978).
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Committee engaged in precisely this same debate in 1973 when it was
proposed to give the FTC authority to proscribe deceptive practices by
banks. 2 The result was the compromise reflected in section 18(f) of the FTC
Act in which FTC rulemaking for non-banks triggers a duty on the part of the
FRB to issue similar rules for banks unless the Board can justify. Even as this
article is written, the Congress has passed legislation4" removing savings and
loan associations from the reach of FTC deceptive practices rulemaking and
according that lawmaking authority to the Home Loan Bank Board; this
division of authority was born out of concern over FTC meddling in the Bank
Board's affairs-and it has the potential for creating the same tensions
between the Bank Board and the FTC as between the Federal Reserve and the
FTC.
At the same time, the Senate has under consideration an amendment to the
pending FTC funding bill, offered by Senator Jepsen of Iowa, which would
essentially require the FTC to get the Federal Reserve's permission before
prosecuting violations of Federal Reserve regulations under Truth in Lending,
Equal Credit Opportunity and similar laws. This would clearly reinforce the
Board's position as primary regulator under those acts, but would not resolve
broader questions of multiple agency rulemaking.
The Next Step
By way of summary, the Subcommittee on Unified Rulemaking has
identified problems with the present regulatory structure, asking deeper
questions about the lack of, and need for, explicit national policy on consumer
credit, pointing out the primary administrative agency friction point as that
due to differing policies between the FRB and the FTC. The creation of a
national consumer credit policy is clearly a task for the Congress, through
clearer delineation of the preemptive effect of federal laws and regulations on
state enactments, and through explicit identification of which regulatory
approach shall prevail-i.e., the FTC's roving commission to deal with unfair
or deceptive practices, or the FRB's narrower authority to implement specific
statutes by regulation.
Questions of possible unification alternatives will occupy the Subcommittee
over the ensuing months: e.g., whether consumer credit rulemaking should be
assigned exclusively to an existing agency (and if so which one), or to a new
entity; whether rulemaking "quality control" needs Congressional action or
can be imposed through the Executive branch; and whether any improvements
can be made in a way that neither sacrifices consumer protection nor
overburdens the credit industry.
42. See S. Rep. No. 93-280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), including "Additional Views of Mr.
Proxmire."
43. Pub. L. No. 96-37 (1979).
